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A Note on Gödel, Priest and Naïve Proof
Abstract. In the 1951 Gibbs lecture, Gödel asserted his famous dichotomy,
where the notion of informal proof is at work. G. Priest developed an ar-
gument, grounded on the notion of naïve proof, to the effect that Gödel’s
first incompleteness theorem suggests the presence of dialetheias. In this
paper, we adopt a plausible ideal notion of naïve proof, in agreement with
Gödel’s conception, superseding the criticisms against the usual notion of
naïve proof used by real working mathematicians. We explore the connec-
tion between Gödel’s theorem and naïve proof so understood, both from a
classical and a dialetheic perspective.
Keywords: incompleteness; standard model; naïve proof; dialetheia; liar
paradox; Curry’s paradox
1. Introduction
In the 1951 Gibbs lecture, Gödel asserted his famous dichotomy that
establishes a widely discussed connection between his incompleteness
theorems and the notion of informal proof. Such a notion has been
here and there discussed in philosophical and logical literature. Specif-
ically, in “The logic of paradox” (Priest, 1979) developed an argument,
grounded on the notion of naïve proof, to the effect that Gödel’s first
incompleteness theorem suggests the presence of dialetheias (viz., sen-
tences that are both true and false) in the standard model of arithmetic.
This last point has been amplified in his “Is arithmetic consistent?”
(Priest, 1994). Although Chihara (1984), Shapiro (2002), Berto (2009)
and others criticized the argument, Priest proposed it again in the first
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edition of In Contradiction and amplified it in the second edition (Priest,
2006) (discussed by Tanswell, 2016, among the others).
Much of the criticism was directed against the notion of naïve proof
itself, particularly against the thesis that everything that is naïvely prov-
able is true. If the notion of naïve proof is understood as embracing
all proofs performed by real working mathematicians, as Priest seemed
to suggest (e.g. Priest, 1994), the thesis is surely untenable. However,
here, we adopt a plausible ideal notion of naïve proof, in agreement with
Gödel’s conception of informal proof. We think that it is worthwhile to
explore here the connection between Gödel’s theorem and naïve proof,
even from a dialetheic perspective, where the consistency of naïve prov-
ability is not assumed.1
2. On naïve proof
Priest characterises the notion of naïve proof (n-proof) as follows:
Proof, as understood by mathematicians (not logicians), is that process
of deductive argumentation by which I establish certain mathematical
claims to be true. In other words, suppose I have a mathematical
assertion, say a claim of number theory, whose truth or falsity I wish
to establish. I look for a proof or a refutation, that is a proof of its
negation... I will call the informal deductive arguments from basic
statements naïve proofs. (Priest, 2006, p. 40)
According to Priest, an alleged paradox is suggested by the anal-
ogy drawn between the familiar informal proof of Gödel’s undecidable
sentence G and the liar paradox:
As is clear to anyone who is familiar with Gödel’s theorem, at its heart
there lies a paradox. Informally the ‘undecidable’ sentence is the sen-
tence ‘this sentence is not provable’. Suppose that it is provable; then,
since whatever is provable is true, it is not provable. Hence it is not
provable. But we have just proved this. So it is provable after all (as
well). (Priest, 2006, p. 237)
The paradox at issue arises in the natural language from the liar paradox
by replacing the notion of truth with that of informal provability. Call it
the unprovability paradox. Like the liar paradox, it is a typical paradox
1 On the same topic of this paper see Shapiro’s interesting recent paper (2019),
specifically sec. 22.5 (entitled “Gödel Meets Curry”), and Priest’s reply to Shapiro
(Priest, 2019), especially sec. 27.21.3 on “Curried Undecidability”.
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of self-reference generated by the sentence
(*) This sentence is unprovable.
One can reason on (*) as follows:
(*) is provable or unprovable. If it is provable, then it is true and hence
unprovable. Thus, in any case, it is unprovable and hence true. So, it is
unprovable. But we have just proved it. So, it is false. Thus, classically,
(*) is paradoxical; dialetheically, it is a dialetheia.
It is evident that the unprovability paradox inspired Gödel’s incom-
pleteness theorem. It is important, however, for our purposes, to stress
that no self-reference is involved in the latter. Gödel’s unprovable sen-
tence G is purely arithmetical; that is, it is built up in terms of the
primitive arithmetical notions. As with any arithmetical sentence, it
involves neither the notion of provability nor any sort of self-reference.
To be more explicit, recall the arithmetical translation of the notion
of formal provability in Peano arithmetic (PA).
Let L be the language of first-order arithmetic and S any sound
extension of PA. Soundness is here understood in the sense that all
S-provable sentences are true in the standard model N of arithmetic.
The metalinguistic relation that correlates a sentence with a (possible)
S-proof of it is expressible arithmetically through a decidable formula
Prf(x, y) (read: y is a proof of x), such that:
(i) if n is the code of a proof of φ then Prf(〈φ〉, n) is PA-provable
(where 〈φ〉 is the code of φ), and
(ii) if n is not the code of an S-proof of φ, then ¬Prf(〈φ〉, n) is PA-
provable.
The arithmetical translation of S-provability is the predicate P (x) =df
∃yPrf(x, y). Therefore, for any sentence A, P (〈A〉) is true iff it is S-
provable. Let G = ¬P (〈G〉) be the Gödel sentence relative to S. Thus,
G is true iff it is not S-provable.
On one hand it turns out that G is S-provable iff ¬G is S-provable.
Since S is sound, it follows classically that G is S-undecidable. On
the other hand, a dialetheist may conjecture that both G and ¬G are
S-provable so that G is a dialetheia. However, observe that such a
conjecture cannot be supported by the unprovability paradox.
In contrast with the ungrounded (in Kripke’s sense) sentence (*), the
truth conditions of G are well defined in arithmetical terms. The fact
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that we can prove, in the meta-language, that it is true if, and only if,
it is unprovable, has nothing to do with its meaning. It does not say of
itself to be S-unprovable; it says that the number 〈G〉 does not satisfy
the arithmetical predicate P (x).
Both the classicist and the dialetheist can infer G from the soundness
of S by the following:
Simple Proof. G is S-provable or not. If it is S-provable, then ¬P (〈G〉)
is true, that is, it is S-unprovable.Thus, in any case, it is unprovable.
Hence, it is true.
Observe that this proof is acceptable even by a dialetheist, since it
does not exploit the consistency but only the soundness of S.
3. Gödel’s dichotomy
Let us recall Gödel’s dichotomy:
Either mathematics is incompletable in this sense, that its evident ax-
ioms can never be comprised in a finite rule, that is to say, the human
mind (even in the realm of pure mathematics) infinitely surpasses the
powers of any finite machine, or else there exist absolute unsolvable
Diophantine problems of the type specified. (Gödel, 1951, p. 310)
Gödel provides a further explanation of his disjunction:
[The incompleteness theorem] makes the incompletability of mathemat-
ics particularly evident. For it makes it impossible that someone should
set up a certain well-defined system of axioms and rules and consistently
make the following assertion about it: all of these axioms and rules I
perceive (with mathematical certitude) to be correct, and moreover I
believe that they contain all of mathematics. If someone makes such a
statement, he contradicts himself. For if he perceives the axioms under
consideration as to be correct, he also perceives (with the same cer-
tainty) that they are consistent. Hence, he has a mathematical insight
not derivable from his axioms. (Gödel, 1951, p. 310)
Though Gödel correlates correctness with consistency, his argument
holds even dialetheically by understanding correctness as soundness in
the above sense.
We think that by “the human mind”, Gödel means the mind of an
idealised human being, free of empirical space-time limitations. To make
A note on Gödel, Priest and naïve proof 5
the idea more explicit, let us introduce a fictional character, Hans. He
is thought of as a classical mathematician, whose reasoning about the
standard model N of arithmetic is free of errors and of empirical space-
time limitations. We say that an arithmetical sentence is naïvely provable
(briefly, n-provable) if Hans can informally recognise its truth in N with
absolute mathematical certainty. As an alleged candidate for formalising
n-provability, Gödel means an axiomatic system with correct axioms
and inference rules. Tanswell (2016) discusses at length the difficulties
of translating informal reasoning into a unique formal system. In the
present paper we don’t want to enter in such discussion.
By a formalisation of n-provability we will simply mean a recursively
enumerable (briefly r.e.) predicate P (x) of first order PA-arithmetic,
satisfied by all and only all (the codes of) n-provable arithmetical sen-
tences. We don’t make any assumption on the structure of n-proofs; in
particular, we don’t assume that they are expressible in the language L
of first order arithmetic. According to this understanding, no formal-
ization of the language of n-proofs is presupposed by a formalisation of
n-provability.
Thus, if P formalises n-provability, given any P-sentence A (i.e. such
that P (〈A〉)), Hans can n-prove A. However, this does not entail that
Hans can n-prove that P is sound, that is, that all infinitely many P -
sentences are true. It may happen that he can recognise the truth of the
P -sentences only one at a time.
Given any r.e. predicate P (x), if Hans can n-prove P -soundness, then,
by using the simple proof, he can n-prove Gödel’s P-unprovable sentence
GP . In this sense, we can say that his mind surpasses the power of P .
In this case, P fails to formalise n-provability. On the other hand, if P
formalizes n-provability, Hans cannot n-prove P -soundness. In this case
GP is true but, classically, absolutely unprovable, i.e. even n-unprovable.
So, we can reformulate Gödel’s dichotomy as follows:
Gödel’s dichotomy. Either no arithmetical predicate P can represent all
n-provable sentences or there is an absolutely unprovable arithmetical
sentence.
Several authors (classical loci are Lucas (1961), Penrose (1994)) have
argued for the first horn, but no one, as far as we know, has produced a
convincing argument that has settled the matter. Anyway, we think that
the first horn is highly plausible, because the creative resources of the
human mind for inventing an informal proof do not seem to be a priori
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determined. Furthermore, an informal proof of an arithmetical sentence
can exploit our basic intuition of absolute finiteness (i.e. independent
of a set-theoretical model) that characterizes the standard model N of
arithmetic, where every number follows finitely many numbers. In con-
trast, no formal system can capture such an intuition, as the presence of
non-standard models shows.
Remember Hilbert’s conviction of the solvability of all mathemati-
cal problems, expressed as an axiom in his lecture at the international
congress in Paris, 1900:
Is the axiom of solvability of every problem a peculiar characteristic
of mathematical thought alone, or is it possibly a general law inherent
in the nature of the mind, that all questions which it asks must be
answerable? This conviction of the solvability of every mathematical
problem is a powerful incentive to the worker. We hear within us the
perpetual call: There is the problem. Seek its solution. You can find it
by pure reason, for in mathematics there is no ignorabimus.
(Hilbert, 1900, as translated in Browder Hilbert, 1976, p. 7)
Furthermore, observe that, since P is r.e., the absolutely unprovable
sentence GP would be a Π1-sentence, that is of form ∀xR(x), where R(x)
is a decidable predicate. It is hard to imagine what could deny Hans a
priori the possibility of recognizing, by means of a suitable reflection on
the deciding rule, that this yields, for every input, the output true.
Be that as it may, from Gödel’s dichotomy, this proposition immedi-
ately follows:
(2.1) If P formalises n-provability, then Hans cannot recognise the P-
soundness.
As we know, from P -soundness, the truth of GP follows. Thus, if
Hans could recognise P -soundness, he could obtain an n-proof of GP ,
and hence the P -unprovability of GP , against the hypothesis that P
represents n-provability.
Now, we want to emphasise that the formalisability of n-provability
may be understood according to two different ways:
1-formalisability. Hans can find a suitable arithmetical predicate P
and n-prove that it codifies n-provability.
2-formalisability. There exists factually an arithmetical predicate P
that codifies n-provability (independently of the possibility of know-
ing this fact).
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Therefore, we can rephrase (2.1) as follows:
(2.2) n-provability fails to be 1-formalisable.
It is worth noting, in passing, that according to the intuitionistic per-
spective, the two meanings of formalisability collapse. The reason is
that the mere existence of an arithmetical predicate satisfying certain
unknowable conditions is, for an intuitionist, unintelligible. Thus, for an
intuitionist, the first horn of Gödel’s dichotomy holds, while the second
does not, since there is no room, intuitionistically, for true unprovable
sentences. (See on that Martin-Löf, 1995).
However, we think that, when dealing with an attempt to formalise
naïve proof, even for a classicist (as well as for a dialetheist), the more
interesting notion is 1-formalisability. If formalisation is perceived as a
device for analysing informal proof, the mere existence of an unknowable
system that in fact proves all n-provable sentences is of no help for the
purpose.
What about Gödel’s dichotomy from the dialetheic perspective?
Here, there is room for a third horn:
Dialetheic trichotomy. (i) No arithmetical predicate represents n-
provability, or (ii) some arithmetical sentence is absolutely unprov-
able, or (iii) some arithmetical sentence is a dialetheia.
Let us introduce an ideal dialetheist, Otto, free of empirical limita-
tions, who reasons, without errors, in accordance with dialetheic logic.
(2.1) becomes
(2.3) If P represents n-provability, then either Otto cannot recognise
P -soundness, or GP is a dialetheia.
(2.2) becomes
(2.4) If n-provability is 1-formalisable then some sentence is a dialetheia.
Priest (for example in 1994) does not consider Gödel’s dichotomy nor
the dialetheic trichotomy. He tries to argue directly for the existence of
a dialetheia as a consequence of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem.
We think, however, that the above trichotomy can be useful for the
discussion of his argument.
Remember that, in order to recover the notion of exclusivity (ban-
ished from logical negation), Priest introduces the notion of rejection,
according to which one cannot accept and reject the same proposition.
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Using such a notion, a dialetheist can immediately reject the existence
of arithmetical dialetheias. As already observed, the truth conditions of
any arithmetical sentence A are well defined in terms of the primitive
arithmetical notions. Now, if A is atomic, its truth value is determined
by a computation that yields a unique value (remember that Otto is
free of empirical limitations, so that he is not affected by the empirical
difficulties of performing any long computation). Thus, the assumption
that A is a dialetheia is clearly rejectable.
Then, the rejection can be forwardly extended to any arithmetical
sentence by an induction on its complexity. We therefore think that a
dialetheist should accept the following proposition:
(2.5) The existence of arithmetical dialetheias is rejectable.
Thus, if Priest’s argument were conclusive, we would obtain an authentic
dialetheic paradox. Let us examine Priest’s argument.
4. Priest’s argument
Priest extends the language L of first-order arithmetic with a predicate
βN(x) on natural numbers, which expresses the fact that x is (the code
of) an n-provable sentence. He claims that the predicate satisfies the
following principles:
(1) ⊢N βN〈α〉 ⊃ α,
(2) If ⊢N α then ⊢N βN〈α〉,
where ⊢N expresses naïve provability. These principles are justified as
follows:
For (1), it is analytic that whatever is naïvely provable is true. [. . . ] And
since this is analytic it is itself naïvely provable. For (2), if something is
naïvely proved then this fact itself constitutes a proof that α is provable.
(Priest, 2006, p. 238)
Then, by the usual method of self-reference, Priest constructs a sen-
tence γ of form ¬βN〈γ〉 and uses the simple proof to show that both γ
and ¬γ are provable. He concludes that arithmetic is inconsistent. Priest
explicitly declares that he has not assumed that βN itself is a predicate
that can be constructed from the usual arithmetic vocabulary (′,+,×).
Now, on one hand, if βN is not arithmetical but is intensionally intro-
duced as the predicate of naïve provability of the arithmetical sentences,
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principles (1) and (2) are to be restricted to any arithmetical α. And
since γ is not arithmetical no contradiction follows. On the other hand, if
βN is intensionally introduced as the predicate of naïve provability of the
sentences of the extended language L∪{βN}, we get an authentic paradox
of self-reference. In this case what is inconsistent is the extended theory.
So, in either case the inconsistence of arithmetic does not follow.
Reminding the source of his interest in what he calls “l’affaire Gödel”,
Priest says:
It seemed to me that the essence of the matter was how we show that the
undecidable sentence is true in the standard model of arithmetic.[. . . ]
To carry out such reasoning, we need a language with a true predicate.
And of course, if the undecidable sentence is indeed provable, the theory
is inconsistent. So we have a contradiction on our hands. Paraconsis-
tency was therefore required. (Priest, 2019, p. 648)
Observe, however, that the truth predicate needed in the naïve proof of
the undecidable sentence is a metalinguistic (non arithmetical) predicate
applicable only to arithmetical sentences. Paraconsistency was therefore
not required.
Priest’s claim that arithmetic is inconsistent seems to be nothing but
a loose way of saying that the extended theory, with the new provability
predicate and the new principles (1) and (2) for the extended language,
is inconsistent.
It is worth noting, however, that, if βN is understood as the n-
predicate for the extended language, it is threatened by Curry’s paradox.
In some papers (for example in Beall and Murzi, 2013; Carrara et al.,
2010; Carrara and Martino, 2011; Shapiro, 2011; Whittle, 2004; for a
survey see Murzi and Carrara, 2015b, sec. 2.2) it is shown how, using
logical principles in agreement with the logic of paradox (Priest (1979)),
a Curry-like argument leads to the triviality of the extended theory.
On the other hand, such conclusion can be avoided by using a suitable
substructural logic (for an introduction see Murzi and Carrara, 2015b,
sec. 2.3; and Ripley, 2015b).2
2 Substructural approaches are sometimes met with skepticism. Field, for exam-
ple, in his Saving Truth from Paradox says that he has not seen: “sufficient reason
to explore this kind of approach (which I find very hard to get my head around),
since I believe we can do quite well without it” (Field, 2008, pp. 10–11). However, as
Murzi and Carrara observed: “While the paradoxes of naïve logical properties don’t
help one getting one’s head around substructural consequence relations [. . . ], these
paradoxes put pressure on Field’s claim that a substructural revision of classical logic
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Be that as it may, subsequently, Priest suggests that βN should be
arithmetically expressible (Priest attributes this observation to A. Visser
in (2006, p. 239, footnote 16)). Briefly, the suggestion arises from the
fact  stressed by Dummett  that when a proof is presented to us, we
are able  at least, in principle,  to recognise it as such:
Intuitionists incline to write as though, while we cannot delimit in ad-
vance the realm of all possible intuitionistically valid proofs, still we
can be certain for particular proofs given, and particular principles of
proof enunciated, that they are intuitionistically correct.
(Dummett, 1978, p. 347)
Thus, assuming a numerical codification of the language of naïve
proofs, the suggestion is that the set of (the codes of) naïve proofs should
be decidable and hence, according to Church’s thesis, recursive, so that
the set of naïvely provable sentences should be recursively enumerable.
On the ground of these considerations, Priest maintains the existence
of an aritmethical predicate β (without a subscript), coextensive with βN.
Gödel’s corresponding sentence γ is arithmetical, and according to him,
it would be a dialetheia. Thus, Priest concludes that arithmetic is con-
tradictory. In the following section, we scrutinise Priest’s argument in
detail.
5. An analysis of Priest’s argument
First, observe that Priest’s appeal to Church’s thesis for n-proofs seems
to be deceptive. According to Church’s thesis, any set of numbers, de-
cidable by means of any mechanical procedure, is recursive. Now, we
agree with Dummett that in principle, the set of naïve proofs must be
decidable. This is to be understood in the sense that when an informal
argument is given, an ideal mathematician is able to decide whether it is
a correct proof or not, according to his own conception of informal but
rigorous mathematical reasoning. Thus, Hans can decide if an alleged
proof is classically correct; likewise, Otto is able to decide whether it
is dialetheically correct. However, what is highly problematic is the
question of whether such an ability is of a mechanical nature. Certainly,
is not needed in order to adequately deal with semantic paradoxes in general. Partly
for this reason, the literature on substructural approaches, . . . , has recently been
burgeoning.” For references on substructural approaches see (Murzi and Carrara,
2015b, p. 10) and the footnote 3 below.
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it is not for Dummett who, as a good intuitionist, explicitly endorses
an anti-mechanistic conception of intuitive reasoning. In the previously
quoted passage, he explicitly observes that “we cannot delimit in advance
the realm of all possible intuitionistically valid proofs” (Dummett, 1978,
p. 347).
On the contrary, the possibility of formalising the notion of n-proof
presupposes that the set of n-proofs is a priori well determined. As
already observed, this seems to be in contrast with the openness of
mathematical creativity.3
Priest insists that a mechanistic conception of the human mind is
needed for explaining how the notion of naïve proof is learned. We
think, in contrast, that the notion of naïve proof is directly acquired
from the understanding of the notion of truth, together with the notion
of knowledge. Naïve proofs are of a semantic nature. Any argument that
leads, with absolute certainty, to the knowledge of the truth of a sentence
A counts as an n-proof of A. This seems to agree with Priest’s above-
quoted explanation of an n-proof as any deductive process by which one
establishes that a mathematical claim is true. Besides, as already ob-
served, an n-proof of an arithmetical sentence may use the fundamental
intuition of the generative process of natural numbers, which no formal
system can capture.
Anyway, let us assume, for the sake of discussion, that a suitable
mechanistic philosophy of mind guarantees that n-provability is formal-
isable. Let us distinguish  as above  between 1-formalisability and 2-
formalisability.
Following the recent literature on this topic (see, in particular, Beall
and Murzi, 2013); on a survey on the topic with references (see Murzi and
Carrara, 2015b, sec. 2.2) we show how also 1-formalizability is threatened
by a Curry-like argument:
(4.1) If n-provability is 1-formalisable, then N is trivial.
Assume that Otto can find a r.e. predicate P (x) and an n-proof that
any arithmetical sentence A is n-provable iff P (〈A〉). In the same vein,
we can assume that Otto can find a r.e. relation R(x, y) and an n-proof
3 A similar objection has been raised by Shapiro: “To invoke Church’s thesis one
must specify an algorithm, a step by step procedure for computing a value, or deciding
a question, a procedure that involves no creativity or use of intuition. And that we
clearly do not have. [. . . ] An instruction to ‘check whether such and such a string is
a good proof’ does not count as a step in an algorithm” (Shapiro, 2019, p. 472).
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that for all sentences A and B, R(〈A〉, 〈B〉) iff B is n-deducible from
A (this means that it is n-provable that from the truth of A in N, the
truth of B in N follows). Given an arbitrary sentence C, Otto can find,
by diagonalisation, a sentence H of form R(〈H〉, 〈C〉). Now, Otto, can
reason as follows:
Assume thatH is true. Then, R(〈H〉, 〈C〉) is true; hence, C is n-provable
from H, and since H, by hypothesis, is true, so is C. Thus, I have proven
C from H. Therefore, R(〈H〉, 〈C〉) is true, that is, H is true. Since C is
n-provable from H, C is true. Since C is arbitrary, N is trivial.
This argument is clearly inspired by Curry’s paradox and it is exten-
sively discussed in the literature.4 A number of controversial strategies 
in particular substructural logics  of restricting the ordinary logic to
block Curry’s paradox have been proposed by several authors (for an
introduction to this topic see (Ripley, 2015b)).5
So one may wonder if the argument we proposed, which rests on
ordinary logic, is reliable. An answer may be that a naïve logic, insofar as
it is compatible with the existence of dialetheias, is fitting to Otto’s naïve
reasoning. We think there is another possible answer: we are not dealing
with Curry’s paradox. As already emphasised, the latter is a paradox
of self-reference, arising in languages where ungrounded sentences (in
Kripke’s sense) are allowed, whereas our Curry-like argument is applied
to first-order arithmetical sentences.
It may be instructive to compare the Curry-like argument we pro-
pose with one, apparently similar. In his paper (2015b) Ripley gives a
formulation of the paradox, using a validity predicate formally, similar
to our R(x, y). He extends the object language by means of a predi-
cate V (x, y), understood as a validity predicate for the extended lan-
4 For a survey see, again, (Murzi and Carrara, 2015b). See also the special issue
edited by Murzi and Carrara (2015a) on Paradox and Logical Revision for an extensive
number of papers on this topic.
5 Substructural approaches can be either of the SContr-free (from Γ , φ, φ ⊢ ψ it
follows that Γ , φ ⊢ ψ) or Cut-free (from Γ ⊢ φ and ∆, φ ⊢ ψ it follows that Γ,∆ ⊢ ψ).
On the first approach, SContr-free, see (Fitch, 1942, 1948, 1950) and recently, among
the others, (Caret and Weber, 2015; Mares and Paoli, 2014; Murzi and Shapiro, 2014;
Priest, 2015; Shapiro, 2011, 2013; Weber, 2014; Zardini, 2011, 2012, 2013a,b, 2014).
On the second approach, the Cut-free approach, (Smiley, 1957)) and (Weir, 2005) have
been recently, and influentially, followed by P. Cobreros, P. Egré, D. Ripley, R. van
Rooij in (2012; 2014). In particular, Ripley in various papers (for example in 2013;
2015a) has developed an inferentialist argument against Cut.
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guage (read V (〈A〉, 〈B〉) as “B follows from A”). The diagonal sentence
ν = V (〈ν〉, 〈⊥〉) leads to trivialism by the same argument used in the
proof exposed in (4.1) (see on this, among the others, Beall and Murzi,
2013). Observe, however, that there is difference between the contexts
of V (x, y) and R(x, y): while ν is a self-referential sentence, which says
of itself to imply ⊥, H is an ordinary arithmetical sentence. The mere
fact that it follows, under the assumption at work, that if H is true,
so is ⊥, has nothing to do with the arithmetical meaning of H, which
does not involve any sort of self-reference. In sec. 2 we made a simi-
lar remark concerning the distinction between the genuine unprovability
paradox and Gödel’s undecidable sentence G. The same difference holds
for the connection between the liar paradox and Tarski’s theorem that
the truth predicate T for arithmetic is not arithmetical. Classical logic,
which, when applied to the liar sentence, leads to a paradox, seems to
be adequate to bring to absurdity the assumption that any arithmetical
predicate is extensionally equivalent to T . Similarly, coming back to
the proof given in (4.1), we think that the mere fact that ordinary logic
is inadequate to solve Curry’s paradox by no means hampers the use
of a Curry-like argument within a framework where no self-reference is
involved. After all, among the various philosophical conceptions about
logical paradoxes, one may embrace the traditional view, going back to
Stoic philosophy, that defends ordinary logic and regards self-referential
sentences as pathological.
Let us formalise the proof of (4.1) in natural deduction, so that one
can judge whether the principles involved are dialetheically acceptable.
Let Γ ⇒ A express that A is naïve consequence of Γ . More explicitly,
Γ ⇒ A is to be read: there is a naïve argument from the premise that
all sentences in Γ are true in N to the conclusion that A is true in N .
Inference rules:
Γ,A⇒ A (Reflection1)
Γ ⇒ A
(Reflection2)
Γ ⇒ A
Γ ⇒ A, ∆⇒ R(〈A〉, 〈B〉)
(R − Elimination)
Γ, ∆⇒ B
Γ,A⇒ B
(R-Introduction)
Γ ⇒ R(〈A〉, 〈B〉)
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A formal deduction of the arbitrary sentence C is the following:
H ⇒ H(Ref.1) H ⇒ R(〈H〉, 〈C〉)(Ref.1)
R-el
H ⇒ C
R-intr
⇒ R(〈H〉, 〈C〉)
⇒ H(Ref.2) ⇒ R(〈H〉, 〈C〉) (Ref.2)
R-el
⇒ C
Insofar as the above proof is dialetheically acceptable, we can con-
clude that, even from the dialetheic perspective, n-provability fails to be
1-formalisable, on pain of triviality.
Observe that this result, far from being paradoxical, is plausible.
Since the great variety of possible means to obtain an n-proof is, a priori,
unsurveyable, it is hard to imagine how, given any r.e. set of n-provable
sentences, one could exclude that some further sentence is n-provable.
It is worth noting, however, that, even if 4.1 is dialetheically accept-
able, it does not reject Priest’s conjecture. The latter does not need
1-formalizability.
Let again P (x) be a r.e. predicate that formalizes n-provability. Sup-
pose that Otto is given such P (x) through its definition. In order to prove
that GP is a dialetheia, Otto does not need to know that P (x) exhausts
all n-provable sentences; he needs only to recognise that it is sound.
For, in this case, he is able to n-prove GP , so that GP is true and hence
¬P (GP ). But, since, as a matter of fact, P (x) formalizes n-provability,
P (GP ) holds. Besides, as P (x) is r.e., Otto can recognize that P (GP )
and conclude that GP is a dialetheia.
One may wonder if, in a similar situation, relative to n-deducibility,
Otto can use the Curry-like argument, to n-prove that N is trivial. The
answer is no.
For, suppose, as above, that R(x, y) formalizes n-deducibility and
that Otto knows that R is sound but does not know that it is exhaustive.
Then, he cannot use the R− Introduction rule since, as observed above,
this exploits the exhaustiveness of R. So he cannot reach the step 5 of
the Curry-like proof.
To sum up, the mere existence of a r.e. predicate P (x) providing
all and only all n-provable sentences does not entail that the relative
Gödel sentence is a dialetheia, because it leaves open the second horn
of the trichotomy, according to which GP would be true but absolutely
unprovable. To reject this horn, Otto should be able to n-prove that
P (x) is sound. If he succeeded to doing that, he would reach a n-proof
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that GP is a dialetheia and, in view of 2.5, an interesting dialetheic
paradox would follow.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed the problem of formalising the notion
of naïve proof for arithmetical sentences from the classical and the di-
aletheic perspectives. We have considered an ideal notion of naïve proof,
which we think is in line with Gödel’s conception of such a notion. To
make it more explicit, we have introduced an ideal classical mathemati-
cian Hans, as well as an ideal dialetheic mathematician Otto, both free of
empirical limitations of space and time; besides, their proofs are always
free of errors. We have distinguished between two notions of formalis-
ability. The first, 1-formalisability, requires the possibility, in principle,
of knowing that a certain system formalises n-provability. The second, 2-
formalisability, requires the mere existence of such a system. By virtue of
Gödel’s dichotomy, 1-formalisability fails classically, while, in a dialetheic
perspective, is affected by a Curry-like argument.
Priest’s conjecture that naïve proof is formalisable is suggested by a
doubtful interpretation of Church’s thesis, which seems to presuppose, a
priori, a mechanistic conception of informal mathematical reasoning.
Anyway, 2-formalisability may hold classically, according to the sec-
ond horn of Gödel’s dichotomy, as well as dialetheically, according to
the second or the third horn of the dialetheic trichotomy. It is, however,
inadequate, in itself, to show Priest’s conjecture of the inconsistency
of N. To prove the conjecture, Otto should recognise the soundness of
the alleged predicate P (x) that formalises n-provability. In this case
he would reach an n-proof that GP is a dialetheia and, in view 2.5, a
noteworthy dialetheic paradox would follow.
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